This paper presents a model for multiple cases of a contest played over a Star Network and then conducts an experiment to test the theoretical predictions. With network externalities, the value of a target/node is dependent on its connectivity to other nodes within the network. The model compares four cases varying qualities of how both the defense and attack forces are allocated and the experiment follows a design using the four cases in the model as treatments. The defense is either allocated by a Defense Planner (DP) or Decentralized Defense (DD) where each node values only its own utility and the attack is either Multi-Target Attack (MTA) or Single-Target Attack (STA). Holding Attacker type constant, theoretical contributions to the Center Node are similar regardless of Defender type and this result holds in the experimental data. However, holding Defender type constant, Defenders should theoretically contribute significantly more defense to the Center Node when facing STA, but Decentralized Defenders do not alter their allocations between treatments.
Introduction
In recent years the world has seen two types of terrorist attacks: Transnational Terrorism and Cyber Terrorism. Transnational Terrorism -highlighted by the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon -differs from Cyber Terrorism -highlighted by the November 2011 attacks on PayPal, Visa, MasterCard, Amazon and many others -in the inability of the Transnational Terrorists to attack a large number of targets at once. Transnational Terrorists are limited in their ability to carry out multiple attacks whereas Cyber Terrorists are far less constrained. Models of attack and defense contests have been used to describe terrorist activity, but only recently have such models begun to incorporate network externalities. If targets experience network externalities, then if one target is lost by the defender not only is that target lost, but any target which trades or communicates with the lost target also experiences a loss of value.
This paper presents a model for a contest played with network externalities under both forms of attack (constrained and unconstrained) . This model fits in the current literature on Robust Networks (where "Robust" here refers to a network's robustness to node failure due to a targeted attack). The model differs from current literature by considering cases where the defense is allocated by a central planner in addition to allocations made by decentralized defenders. In the second case of defense allocations each node receives a budget for defense that may be allocated as the person controlling the node desires. This type of defensive allocation more closely resembles current models of networks where individual nodes care only for their own utility as opposed to the utility of the network as a whole which can lead to self-interest interfering with efficiency. By varying the types of attack and defense, I have four models for contests with network externalities.
After describing the four models, I fully characterize the equilibrium allocations for both defense and attack for the case of a Star Network. I find that, regardless of the model, the unique equilibrium has defenders placing equal allocations to each periphery node which only leaves the question of how much to allocate to the Center Node. Holding constant the attacker type, the defense allocations to the Center Node do not much vary in equilibrium; however, when holding constant the defender type, the equilibrium defense allocations to the Center Node are significantly larger when facing a constrained attacker. I complete the paper by conducting an experiment on the four cases of the model. To the author's knowledge this is the first paper which conducts an experiment surrounding the question of the Robustness of a Star Network to an outside attack. I find that actual allocations are similar to equilibrium predicitions except in the case of decentralized defenders who face a constrained attacker. In particular, the actual defense allocations to the Center Node in this treatment are significantly below equilibrium predictions in a way one might expect to see for a public good. This surprising result seems to suggest that a Star Network is Robust in behavioral settings when the defense is centrally planned, but may not be when the defense is organized in a decentralized manner even though theory predicts it should be.
The literature on Contests with Network Externalities is similar to that of Contests with Identity-Dependent Externalities (Klose and Kovenock, 2013) . Contests with IdentityDependent Externalities is an extension of the basic contest model where a node's value is equal to the inherent value of survival in addition to an externality received from the survival of other nodes. Contests with Network Externalities allow for the externality to depend on not only whether or not the other node survives but additionally whether or not the two nodes are still connected with one another (and, possibly, the distance of the connection). Thus, Contests with Network Externalities is an extension of Contests with Identity-Dependent Externalities where the latter can be described as a contest played on a complete network and the former allows for generic network topologies.
One such alternative topology that many networks exhibit is a scale-free structure. Airline Networks and the Internet are two examples of scale-free networks, as shown by Albert et al. (1999) . A scale-free network is one that has few centralized, highly-connected nodes and many peripheral, minimally-connected nodes. were the first to discuss a model for a random graph where the resultant graph is scale-free. The limiting case of a scale-free network is a network with a single Center Node where every other node in the network has a single link to the Center Node and no other links exist. Such networks are called Star Networks. Given the relative simplicity of Star Networks coupled with their similarity to networks observed in the field, Star Networks have been the primary focus of recent literature on networks and is the focus of this paper.
Given the two examples of scale-free networks, it is natural to ask the question "Are scale-free networks (and, by extension, Star Networks) robust to node failure caused by an outside attack?" Airline Networks are susceptible to Transnational Terrorist attacks and the Internet is susceptible to Cyber Terrorism, and given the possibility of targeted attack we are left to wonder if scale-free (Star) networks are optimal or if other topologies are more robust.
Using the network's diameter as a proxy for its value, Albert et al. (2000) use simulations to show that scale-free networks are not robust to node failure due to targeted attack unless the attack is extremely weak. This result is due to the attacker's ability to focus on the central nodes which, when removed, cause large disruptions. Based on the results in their paper Albert et al. would not recommend a Star Network if the nodes are susceptible to a targeted attack since the attacker may focus on the Center Node. As in Figure 1 , if a Periphery Node is lost, then the remainder of the network is still fully connected, however, if the Center Node is lost, then all externalities are lost. The top left graph is a Star Network. To the right is the residual network which results when a single Periphery Node is lost. This residual network is fully connected. To the bottom is the residual network which results when the Center Node is lost. The residual network here is empty and all value from connectivity is lost. Due to an attacker's ability to target the Center Node, Albert, Jeong and Barabási would not recommend a Star Network.
Recent attempts to answer the robustness question for Star Networks in the economic literature note that Albert et al. (2000) do not allow for an intelligent defender to counter the potential attack (attacks succeed with an exogenous random probability). Recent models of Robust Networks allow for an intelligent defender and the models take place in (potentially) two stages. In the first stage a network formation game is played and, after observing the network, an attacker is brought into the fray during the second-stage contest. The first stage network formation game follows with the literature on this subject and the most common model used the Connections Model as discussed in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Bala and Goyal (2000) . For a complete survey on models of network formation see Jackson (2008) .
The second stage contest follows in particular Tullock contests (Tullock, 1980) the theoretical implications of which are described in Roberson (2006) and Kovenock and Roberson (2008) .
In this paper, I ignore the first stage Network Formation game to focus on the contest played over a Star Network. In particular, the contest is a colonel blotto game with non-valuable, non-storable budgets where the "prizes" are the nodes in a Star Network. This paper contributes most to the literature on models for network defense which include Clark and Konrad (2007) , Kovenock and Roberson (2010) , Acemoglu et al. (2013 ), Hoyer (2013 , De Jaegher and Hoyer (2010), Dziubiński and Goyal (2013a) , Goyal and Vigier (2011 ), Bachrach et al. (2011 ), and Dziubiński and Goyal (2013b . Clark and Konrad (2007) and Kovenock and Roberson (2010) are strictly interested in Weakest-Link and Best-Shot Networks and the conectivity of starting and ending nodes whereas the rest of the papers consider connectivity issues in a more broad sense. Hoyer (2013) and De Jaegher and Hoyer (2010) have attackers targetting links and defenders choosing to add link redundancies as a form of defense whereas the remainder of the papers have contests played along the nodes rather than the links. The final paper Dziubiński and Goyal (2013b) is the closest to the model presented in this paper. They find that, in the case of Decentralized Defenders there is large potential inefficient outcomes whereas I find little to no loss of efficiency. While there are multiple differences between this paper and Dziubiński and Goyal (2013b) , the driving difference is that I have non-valuable budgets for defense and attack which means that there is no potential for lost efficiency due to underproviding the resource and any loss in efficiency can only result from the allocation process. This paper also adds to the literature on experimental contests (particularly Colonel Blotto games). In particular, Chowdhury et al. (2012) test a few of the implications of the Colonel Blotto game, Mago and Sheremeta (2012) test a model of Multi-Battle contests, and test the model of Weakest-Link and Best-Shot Networks. For a complete review of such studies see Dechenaux et al. (2012) A major simplifying assumption made for this paper is the exclusion of a network formation stage. A companion paper includes the first stage and discusses when a Star Network is robust. Due to the complicated nature of both network formation and contests, the purpose of this simplification is an attempt to avoid confusing the experimental subjects. Instead, defenders are exogenously given a Star Network which they must defend from the attackers. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a set of nodes. Let g be a graph which consists of the set of nodes and a set of links. We will assume a simply-connected network with non-directed information transfer. Two nodes i, j ∈ N are directly linked if ij ∈ g. If ij / ∈ g then no direct link exists between nodes i and j. Node i is said to be a singleton if j ∈ N such that ij ∈ g. Additionally, g − ij is the graph g removing link ij and g + ij is the graph g adding link ij. Let the value of a graph, g, be defined by the function v : {g | g ⊂ g N } → R where g N denotes the complete graph. The following assumptions (1 -4) clarify the form of the value function that is necessary for the model. 
where U i (g) is the value of node i given network g.
Assumption 2. Utility functions U i (g) are anonymous: Given any permutation of players π and any
for any permutation π and any node i.
Assumption 3. Utility functions U i (g) are separable between benefits, u i (g), and costs, c i (g).
Assumption 4. u(g) is increasing, and n i=1 u i (g) is strictly increasing and strictly convex in nodes added in exact manner.
Let i, j, k ∈ N where j and k are singletons in network g.
Assumption 1 states that each node within the network has its own value and that the value of the entire network is the sum of the values of each node, Assumption 2 merely means that nodes are ex ante homogeneous (ie the only heterogeneity among nodes is caused by the network topology), and Assumption 3 allows for the utility function to be split between benefits of network connectivity and costs of link formation. Assumption 4 contains two parts: the first part claims that the benefits to any node in the network are nondecreasing with the addition of any link, and the second part is that the total sum of benefits is strictly convex in a way. This final assumption is weaker than a strict convexity assumption by requiring that only increases in the size of the component that occur in the exact same manner (rather than any increase in the component size) result in a sum benefits function that is increasingly increasing. Example 1. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) define the following model for Network Formation known as the Connections Model.
where w ii is the value to node i for being in the network, w ij is the value to node i for being connected to node j, δ ∈ (0, 1) is the parameter for information decay within the network,
is the shortest distance between nodes i and j within the network and c ij is the cost to node i for forming a link with node j. If homogeneity is assumed, then we can normalize w ii = w 0 , w ij = w and c ij = c ∀i, j ∈ N which simplifies the model to
It can be easily shown that U i satisfies all Assumptions 1 -4.
The Network Contest
Disregarding a stage for Network Formation, assume a network g is exogenously given. Since the network is exogenously given we will make a final assumption that the standard costs of network formation are not paid, i.e. c i (g) = 0 ∀i, g. This assumption can be made because the costs are taken as sunk in the second stage contest. Therefore the value of the network Both attacker and defender choose effort levels at each node subject to their budget constraints. Let a i be the total level of attack at node i and let d i be the total level of defense at node i. Let p(a i , d i ) denote the probability that the attacker wins node i given a i and d i and assume that p is well-behaved. 
In the final residual network, the defender's profit at each node is equal to the value of the node in the residual network. The attacker's profit is equal to the profit that was lost by the defender. Thus we have,
The game is a constant-sum, Colonel Blotto contest with non-valuable, non-storable budgets where the total value of the contest is the initial value of the network v(g).
Defender and Attacker Profits in Four Cases
I consider four cases of the model. The four cases result by varying a quality in both the attacker and defender.
For the attacker, the varied quality is the number of nodes he is allowed to target at one time. A common assumption in political science and economic models on Transnational Terrorism is to assume that the attacker is restricted to targetting one node at a time, such as in Powell (2007) . One can logically validate this assumption by recognizing that transnational terrorists face difficulties targeting multiple sites due to large fixed costs associated with launching such an attack. However, as mentioned in Goyal and Vigier (2011) , Cyber Terrorism faces no such limitation and cyber terrorists frequently target multiple sites during one attack. This paper will refer to these cases as Single-Target Attack (STA) and Multi-Target Attack (MTA) respectively.
Defenders face no limitation on how many of the nodes may be defended at one time (outside of the restriction of the budget constraint). Instead, the defense varies depending on how it is allocated. In most multi-battle Tullock contests there is but a single Defense Planner who plans the defense for every site. However this game's design lends itself to multiple entities that plan a Decentralized Defense. In this case, each node represents its own entity which earns only the profit at its own node leading to choices made based on self-interest rather than the group-interest. These cases are referred to as Defense Planner (DP) and Decentralized Defense (DD).
The following subsections define the problem faced by the attacker and defender(s) under each of the four cases. Before we move on, however, we must clarify what has changed mathematically from the base model. Since the budgets are assumed to have no trade-in value, neither the attacker nor the defender has any incentive to not allocate the entire budget. In the STA treatments, attackers may only target one node at a time. Thus ∀i = 1, . . . , n a i ∈ {0, A} and ∃i ∈ N such that a i = A and ∀j = i, a j = 0 and the attacker is no longer deciding the level of attack. Instead, he attacks node i with full force with probability α i . In the DD treatments, defenders now only receive part of the total defense 
Defense Planner with Multi-Target Attack (DP -MTA)
The Defense Planner solves
and the Multi-Target Attacker attacker solves
Defense Planner with Single-Target Attack (DP -STA)
and the Single-Target Attacker solves
where
Decentralized Defense with Multi-Target Attack (DD -MTA)
When there is Decentralized Defense, defender k solves
Decentralized Defense with Single-Target Attack (DD -STA)
and the Single-Target attacker solves
Equilibrium allocations for a Star Network
For a Star Network the models above greatly simplify. If we label the Center Node as C and the periphery nodes as 1, 2, . . . , n − 1 where n is the number of nodes in the Star Network, then we are able to make a few claims about the equilibrium in this game. exists an equilibrium where d 1 = d 2 = · · · = d n−1 and a 1 = a 2 = · · · = a n−1 for MTA or
Step 1: Show that if the attacker (defender) plays a periphery-symmetric allocation, then the best response for the defense (attack) is a periphery-symmetric allocation.
Step 2: Define best response correspondences d C (a C ) for the defender and either a C (d C )
or α C (d C ) for the attacker assuming periphery symmetry and show that the functions are continuous.
Step 3: Note that
Step 4: Use Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem to show that a fixed point (and equilibrium) must exist.
Proposition 2. The equilibrium described in Proposition 1 is unique.
Proof.
2
Propositions 1 and 2 combine to show that, for a Defense Planner, there exists a unique equilibrium where both the defender and attacker treat the periphery nodes as equivalent which I refer to as "periphery-symmetric". This means that to find the unique equilibrium in this game, we need consider the case of only a single choice variable -amount/probability to allocate to the Center Node.
If a final assumption that the defense endowments are split equally among all periphery
, then similar propositions about the existence and uniqueness of a periphery symmetric equilibrium can be made. there exists an equilibrium where a 1 = a 2 = · · · = a n−1 for MTA or α 1 = α 2 = · · · = α n−1
for STA and the defense satisfies all of the following:
1 See the Appendix for the complete proof (provided upon request).
2 See the Appendix for the proof (provided upon request).
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 1 above.
3
Proposition 4. The equilibrium described in Proposition 3 is unique.
4
Propositions 3 and 4 show that there exists a unique, periphery-symmetric equilibrium for allocations in the case of Decentralized Defense. Proposition 3 also states that periphery nodes will never allocate resources to other periphery nodes (allocating only to themselves and the Center Node) and that each periphery node allocated defense symmetrically.
Propositions 1 -4 show that, regardless of the case, we need only know the equilibrium allocation of defense to the Center Node as the remaining budget is split equally among each periphery node. If we define d
, and d
DD-STA C
to be the equilibrium Center Node defense allocation in the respective case, then we may question the differences in this value among the cases.
Proposition 5. For any set budgets D, A > 0 and nodes n ≥ 3, the following ordering of Center Node allocations must always hold.
Step 1: Show that for a Single-Target Attacker, either the attacker always attacks the Center Node or there exists a unique allocation of defense which causes the attacker to be indifferent between attacking each node. This means that Decentralized Defense is first-best
Step 2: Consider Best-Response Functions d C (a C ) and a C (d C ) for the case of DP-MTA.
Show that
Step 3: Consider Best-Response Functions d i i (a C ) and a C (d C ) for the case of DP-MTA.
Proposition 5 shows that there is a nice ordering for the defense allocations to the Center
Node. For the case of a Single-Target Attacker, Decentralized Defense is first-best. The intuition behind this result is that there is a single allocation which results in the attacker being indifferent between attacking each of the nodes. The attacker must be indifferent; otherwise there will be a node which is attacked with zero probability which will cause the defender to place no defense on that node. In the case of Multi-Target Attacker however, selfinterested periphery nodes will combat with efficiency causing a welfare gap (and a smaller defense allocation to the Center Node). Finally, Proposition 5 shows that the allocation of defense to the Center Node is strictly greater when facing STA as opposed to MTA.
The following section provides an experimental design which will test the hypotheses of the model provided in Propositions 1 -5.
3 Experimental Design
Parameters used in Experiment
In order to test the model in the lab I choose simple parameters in order to develop simple theoretical predictions. To begin, the network g chosen for this experiment is, as the title suggests, a Star Network with six nodes. The Center Node is labeled C and the Periphery Nodes are labeled 1, 2, 3, 4, 5.
The value of a node in the network is 100 * (the number of other nodes it is connected to). Note that this does not require a direct connection to another node, a node will receive value from a node it is indirectly connected to. At the start of a round the value of each node in the network is 100 * 5 = 500 and the value of the network is 6 * 500 = 3000. This formation for the value of a node is fundamentally the Connections Model defined by the parameters w, δ and c. In this experiment, w = 100, δ = 1 − and c = 0.
6
The attacker's budget is A = 40 and the total defense budget is D = 120. In the Decentralized Defense treatments, each defender receives an equal split of the inital endowment, ∀k = 1, . . . , n D k = 20. The assumption that A < D is common to multi-battle tullock contests with an attacker. Finally, the probability that the attacker wins a node follows a Table 1 lists all of the variables needed for equilibrium analysis. In star networks the periphery nodes are symmetric; thus, in the contest equilibrium, the periphery nodes are symmetric with respect to the attack and defense efforts placed on the nodes. Therefore, d i , a i , α i and Π D i are associated with all of the periphery nodes. Table 2 lists the equilibrium allocations and profits for all players in all treatments. The primary determining factor in differences in the equilibrium across treatments is whether the attacker is Single-Target Attacker or Multi-Target Attacker. There is little to no change between the DP and DD treatments, however Π D in STA treatments is significantly larger than Π D in MTA treatments. In STA treatments, we restrict the play of the attacker, so the attacker must do at least as well in the MTA treatments. Since the restriction placed on attackers in the STA treatments is stifling, the defenders are able to maintain a much larger chunk of the network profits.
Theoretical Predictions
Regardless of whether the defense is allocated by a Defense Planner or arises from a Decentralized Defensive force, equilibrium defense allocations under the case of Single-Target Attack are equivalent. This means that in the Decentralized Defense, self-interest does not combat group interest. The unique equilibrium has each periphery node keeping 5 units at their own node and giving 15 units to the Center node (and the Center node keeps all of her units of defense). In order to keep the periphery nodes indifferent between contributing to their own defense and the defense of the Center Node, the attacker must attack the Center Node with greater probability.
There are differences in the equilibrium allocation between the DP -MTA and DD -MTA treatments, however the differences are exceptionally small. Thus self-interest does combat group interest, but is not an important factor (only costing the network an expected 0.25 points). The unique equilibrium has each periphery node keeping 14.9 units at their own node and giving 5.1 units to the Center node (and the Center node keeps all of her units of defense).
Procedures
The experiment was conducted at the Vernon Smith Experimental Economics Laboratory at Purdue University. A total of 144 subjects participated in 8 sessions with 18 subjects per session (see Figure 2 ). Sessions were conducted during Fall 2012.
The experiment consisted of four treatments. As outlined previously, the defense quality was varied between Defense Planner and Decentralized Defense and the attack quality was varied between Single-Target Attack and Multi-Target Attack. This leads to a 2 × 2 design (as indicated in Figure 2 ). The experiment was conducted using a between-subject design.
Some subjects had participated in other experiments, but none had participated in similar experiments. The computerized experimental sessions used zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) . Each session proceeded in three parts. At the beginning of each part, instructions were given to the subjects and read aloud. The first part of the experiment consisted of the network contest game. After the instructions were read, subjects took a 10 question quiz about the instruc-tions where each correct answer was awarded $0.50. Upon completion of the quiz, subjects participated in 30 rounds of the network contest in one of the four treatments. Of the 30 rounds, only 6 were paid and these rounds were randomly selected at the end of the session.
After the network contest I elicited the subject's attitudes toward risk using a multiple lottery set up as in Holt and Laury (2002) (12) subjects were split between two (2) networks which were paired one-to-three with six (6) attackers each period for thirty periods. In Decentralized Defense treatments, three of the attackers were paired with one network while the other three were paired with the other, the defenders only saw the outcome of one of the attackers, but each attacker saw his/her own outcome. Thus, a total of 60 networks are observed with 60 total defense allocations and 180 attack allocations in each session.
Subjects in all sessions acted as both a defender and attacker over the course of the session.
Subjects in DP treatments acted as a defender for exactly 15 periods and an attacker for exactly 15 periods. Subjects in DD treatments acted as a defender for exactly 20 periods and an attacker for exactly 10 periods. As in , the purpose of role switching is to avoid social preference caused by the disadvantaged attacker (as in the Single-Target
Attack treatments) since all subjects knew about the switching mechanism and to induce learning since subjects have an opportunity to experience the game in both roles.
Instead of referring to the subjects as "attackers" and "defenders," neutral framing was used by instead calling them circle types and square types. 7 On the screen, subjects saw a depiction of the network of which there is a screenshot in the instructions.
The second part of the experiment was a risk elicitation task. Subjects were given a list of 15 lotteries where they could choose either a riskless option ($1.00) or a risky option ($3.00 with some probability and $0.00 otherwise). At the end of the experiment one of the lines was selected for payment.
The third part of the experiment was an envy elicitation task. Subjects were asked to choose between two options for a split of money between themselves and a partner. Subjects made this decision four times and each time one of the options was an equal split of money and the other was an unequal split. In the first two choices, the unequal split led to higher earnings for the subject making the decision in comparison to the partner. In the second two choices, the unequal split led to lower earnings for the subject making the decision in comparison to the partner.
In the quiz, subjects who answered 9 or 10 questions correctly are said to have "Good Quiz Performance", subjects who answered 7 or 8 questions correctly are said to have "Average
Quiz Performance" and subjects who answered fewer than 7 questions correctly are said to have "Poor Quiz Performance". In the risk task, subjects are defined as "Risk Averse"
if they chose the non-risky option every time it was the profit maximizing option and at least a few times when it was not, subjects are defined as "Risk Seeking" if they chose the risky option every time it was the profit maximizing option and at least a few times when it was not, subjects are defined as "Risk Neutral" if they always chose the profit maximizing option and subjects are defined to have "Non-Monotonic Risk Preferences" if they do not fit the previous three categories. In the envy task, subjects are defined as "Behind Averse"
if they chose the equal split of money in both instances when the non-equal split led to an unfavorable outcome in comparison to the other player and subjects are defined as "Ahead Averse" if they chose the equal split of money in both instances when the non-equal split led to a favorable outcome in comparison to the other player.
Hypotheses
Based on the equilibrium predictions, there are four hypotheses we will test.
Hypothesis 1. For Defense Planners and Multi-Target Attackers, there will be a relatively small variance of the budget placed on the periphery nodes. For Single-Target Attackers, the frequency of attack on the periphery nodes will be the same.
We anticipate Defense Planners and Attackers to recognize the symmetry of the periphery nodes and place equivalent amounts of effort on each. If this is the case, then the variance of the budget placed on the periphery nodes would be equal to zero. Thus, we anticipate small variance on the periphery. For Decentralized Defenders, a zero-variance periphery requires perfect coordination among the subjects. This is highly unrealistic, particularly due to the inability for the Defender to communicate strategies. Thus the periphery variance is expected to be larger for this case.
Hypothesis 2. For Attacker type MTA, there will be no distinguishable difference between allocations to the Center Node for Attackers and Defenders regardless of the Defense type (DP or DD).
Hypothesis 3. For Attacker type STA, there will be no distinguishable difference between defense allocations to the Center Node regardless of the Defense type (DP or DD) and Attackers will attack the Center Node more frequently when facing DD compared to DP.
Hypothesis 4. Holding the Defense type (DP or DD) constant, defense allocations to the Center Node will be greater when the defense is facing STA as opposed to MTA.
The final four hypotheses cover the directional predictions of the treatment effects.
Results
This section presents the results from the experiment. For all results, the first five periods are ignored. During the first few periods, subjects are still exploring the strategies of the game. Behavior settles into a pattern after about the fifth period in the data (see Figure 3) . (25, 25, 25, 20, 20) which has a variance of 30. An example from the data of a Med Variance is (20, 20, 20, 20, 10) which has a variance of 80. An example from the data of a High Variance is (9, 9, 9, 18, 0) which has a variance of 162. In equilibrium, the periphery nodes are equivalent and by looking at the variance we are able to see if subjects recognize this fact. Based on Figure 4 we see that Defense Planners allocate equivalent units to all periphery nodes (resulting in zero variance) more than 50% of the time, and allocate approximately equivalent units a large portion of the time. This supports previous research which suggests that subjects recognize equivalent battlefields (Chowdhury et al., 2012) .
When defense is decentralized, the variance of periphery nodes is expected to be significantly larger than that for a Defense Planner due to the inability of the subjects to communicate their strategies to one another. However, since subjects change which node they are in charge of every period, there is no possible way to predict the pattern of large expenditures and no single node receives, on average, a statistically significant amount larger than any other node. Figure 5 shows results for Multi-Target Attackers that correspond to those of Figure 4 for defenders: Attackers recognize the equivalence of periphery nodes and choose an alloca- tion that has zero periphery variance over 40% of the time. Guerilla warfare (0, 0, 0, 0, 40) corresponds to a variance of 1280, which suggests that Attackers usually do not attempt a guerilla-style attack strategy. Table 3 shows the percentage of the time a periphery node is chosen for attack in Single-Target Attack treatments. Since it is difficult to tell in a small number of periods the mixed strategy employed by an individual, the numbers in Table 3 are pooled across all individuals in all sessions within a treatment. There is some evidence for equivalent focus on the periphery nodes with a bit of emphasis on the first and last nodes. This extra focus is likely due to the presentation of the problem to the subjects. The emphasis on the first node is likely due to it being labeled as "Node 1" and the emphasis on the last node is likely due to it being listed last in the table of choices.
Result 1. Multi-Target Attackers and Defense Planners generally recognize the equivalence of the periphery nodes by placing an equivalent or nearly equivalent level of budget on each periphery. Single-Target Attackers attack each periphery node with a roughly equivalent probability. Decentralized Defenders are unable to reach a low periphery variance. Table 4 shows the difference between the average allocation to the Center Node and the equilibrium allocation and whether the difference is statistically significant for the MTA treatments which is most comparable to the case of a Cyber Terrorist. Total allocations to the Center Node are not meaningfully different from the equilibrium allocation in any case. While Multi-Target Attackers who face Defense Planners are allocating more of their budget to the Center Node than theory might predict, the difference is not meaningful.
When facing a Cyber Terrorist
If the Defenders are best responding to this level of attack, then the final expected profit for Multi-Target Attackers is approximately $0.01 below the optimal level for the entire experiment. Clearly, while this difference is statistically significant, there is no economically significant difference between actual and predicted allocations in this circumstance.
Hypothesis 2 states that there should be no difference between total allocations (either defense or attack) to the Center Node when holding the attacker type MTA constant but varying whether the defense is allocated by a Defense Planner or Decentralized Defense. Table 5 shows that this hypothesis holds. Result 2. When holding MTA constant and varying how the defense is allocated (DP or DD) neither the total attack allocation nor total defense allocation to the Center Node vary in any statistically significant way.
This result seems to suggest that, when facing a Cyber Terrorist, the defense may be allocated efficiently regardless of how it is allocated; thus, Defense Planners do not outperform the Decentralized Defenders in this case. Table 6 shows the difference between the average allocation to the Center Node and the equilibrium allocation and whether the difference is statistically significant for the STA treatments which is most comparable to the case of a Transnational Terrorist. Total defensive allocations to the Center Node are significantly below equilibrium predictions in both cases (DP and DD).
When facing a Transnational Terrorist
In the previous Hypothesis 3 states that there should be no difference between total allocations for defense to the Center Node when holding the attacker type STA constant but varying whether the defense is allocated by a Defense Planner or Decentralized Defense and that attack probability to the Center Node should be higher when facing Decentralized Defense. Table   7 shows that this hypothesis does not hold for defense allocations. This result seems to suggest that, when facing a Transnational Terrorist, the Defense Planners greatly outperform the Decentralized Defenders. Even though Defense Planners are not allocating as much as they should (according to equilibrium prediction) to the Center
Node it seems that a Defense Planner is still vastly preferable to a Decentralized Defense.
Defense Planner or Decentralized Defense?
Hypothesis 4 states that, when holding constant the defender type, the total allocation to the Center Node should be significantly higher when facing STA compared to when facing MTA. Table 8 shows that this hypothesis seems to hold for Defense Planners, but does not hold for Decentralized Defenders. Certainly the most surprising result of this experiment is that there is absolutely no difference between allocations by Decentralized Defenders regardless of the type of attacker they are facing. In the case of MTA, the equilibrium has Decentralized Defenders allocating a total of 45.5 units of effort to the Center Node and they actually allocate 51.97 units. In the case of STA, the equilibrium has Decentralized Defenders allocating a total of 95 units of effort on the Center Node -more than twice that of the case of MTA -and they actually allocate only 50.06 units. While the difference is not statistically significant, it's even worse as the difference is negative when it should be positive and quite large.
This is a confusing result and needs to be explored further. One posible explanation is that, while it is not a public good, the Center Node may seem like a Public Good to the uninitiated. The Center Node in this game shares some properties with Public Goods that may cause subjects to employ a free-rider strategy even though doing so is not optimal.
Conclusion
In this paper, I provide a model for Robust Networks which differs from other models by 
